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DYNAMICS OF AIRLINE CRASH LITIGATION:
WHAT MAKES THE CASES MOVE?
STUART M. SPEISER*
INTRODUCTION
W ITH OUR state and federal courts crowded to overflowing
and court time at a premium, and with jumbo jet accidents
bringing hundreds of claimants into the courts at one time, it is
essential that those concerned with the administration of justice
take a close look at the most important practical question in this
type of litigation: what makes the cases move? What procedures
and devices can the courts use to bring these cases to a conclusion
as quickly as possible, at the same time preserving the rights of
all the litigants?
1. The Forces at Work
Airline crash litigation really started in the post World War II
era of the late 1940s and early 1950s. There were a few trials
prior to World War II, but they really belong to the Stone Age
of aviation litigation. In the 1940s and 1950s, the courts were
dealing with accidents to aircraft like the Douglas DC-3, which
carried a maximum of twenty-one passengers. Later the DC-4 came
into the picture, as a civilian conversion of the wartime Douglas
C-54 transport, seating about fifty to sixty passengers in various
versions. Both of these aircraft were rather simple to operate com-
pared to today's complex jet liners, and the litigation arising out of
their accidents was correspondingly simple. It was rare to find any-
one named as a defendant other than the airline which operated the
aircraft. Manufacturing defects were hard to find and harder to
prove. The doctrine of strict tort liability for defective products
* J.D., Columbia University. Member of the bars of New York, the District
of Columbia, and Connecticut. Author of 14 books, including Recovery for
Wrongful Death (2d Ed. 1975).
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was not yet established in the courts. The federal government
was rarely joined as a defendant (except in those few instances
where there was a mid-air collision near an airport), since the
Federal Tort Claims Act was not adopted until 1946, and for
many years thereafter the "discretionary function" defense hovered
over such claims and made them difficult to prosecute!
By the 1970s, this picture had changed dramatically. The air-
liners of this era are much more complex than the DC-3s and
DC-4s, and of course they carry many more passengers. In ad-
dition, aviation has become so complicated that the types of
accidents that occurred in the DC-3 days are comparatively rare.
Typically, a DC-3 accident would involve a pilot straying off course
and flying into a mountain, or trying to make an approach in
instrument weather while operating partly on instruments and
partly on visual flight rules. There was usually very little difficulty
in fixing the cause, and only rarely was there occasion to sue de-
fendants other than the airline itself. In the world of the DC-10,
the Lockheed 1011, and the Boeing 747, however, it is difficult
to separate the responsibilities and causative factors which arise
from airline operations, aviation manufacturing, and government
regulation. There is now a maze of federal aviation regulations
which place responsibilities upon airlines, manufacturers, and FAA
personnel in a very broad spectrum of situations
The stakes are so high in aviation today, the airliners are so
expensive, and air safety has advanced so much, that there are
now many backup systems which are designed to avoid accidents.
You will not expect to see a jumbo jet involved in a DC-3 type ac-
cident, in which the pilot strays off course or gets "off the beam"
during an instrument approach. What you are more likely to see
is an accident in which the airline, manufacturers, and govern-
ment each play some part.
IDalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See generally 2 L. JAYSON,
HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES S
249.01-.02 (1964).
2The Federal Aviation Regulations will be found at 14 C.F.R., Parts 1-199.
The parts most often involved in airline crash litigation are 25 (Airworthiness
Standards, Transport Category Airplanes); 61 (Certification: Pilots and Flight
Instructors); 63 (Certification: Flight Crewmembers Other Than Pilots); 91
(General Operating and Flight Rules); 97 (Standard Instrument Approach Pro-
cedures); 121 (Certification and Operations: Domestic, Flag and Supplemental
Air Carriers, etc.); and 129 (Operations of Foreign Air Carriers).
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Because jumbo jets are so complicated, it is almost impossible
to design them without some defects. Because of their great speed
and the disintegration of the wreckage, it is often impossible to
pinpoint the exact cause of a jet crash. At the outset of litigation,
it is practically impossible for plaintiffs to be certain that the
airline will be the only responsible party. Even though the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) procedures for hearings
and reports on accidents are probably the best in the world, they
are concerned with bringing out facts relating to aviation safety
rather than determining fault. Often there are facts that can be
presented by an airline in defense of its own position that do not
come out in NTSB hearings. Sometimes these facts point toward
liability of another party, such as a manufacturer or the FAA.
Accordingly, a plaintiff who makes a decision to go into court
against the airline alone may be taking a grave risk that he will
be confronted at the trial by evidence which tends to place the
blame on an absent non-defendant. It is too late to bring such
parties in as defendants at the time of trial. For that reason, plain-
tiffs' attorneys in airline litigation have developed the practice of
being extremely conscientious in naming all potentially liable par-
ties as defendants.
Aviation is probably one of the best documented activities in
the world. There are literally thousands of pages of manuals, regu-
lations, and forms which relate to the design, construction, opera-
tion, and regulation of jet aircraft. Often there is evidence in this
mass of documents which helps to establish liability on the part
of airlines, manufacturers, and the government. Unless the govern-
ment and the manufacturers are joined as defendants, it is difficult
to obtain access to these documents. Thus, the great complexity
of modern aviation puts pressure on plaintiffs' attorneys to sue all
parties involved in manufacturing, operating, and regulating the
aircraft in question. This tendency toward multiple defendants has
been accelerated by two developments of the past quarter century:
the trend toward strict liability for product defects3 and the ex-
panded concept of government liability under the Federal Tort
s The first holding of strict liability of a manufacturer in an airline case was
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
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Claims Act.4
Another complicating factor is the huge increase in value of air-
craft. In the DC-3 days, aircraft hull values were in the range of
$50,000 to $100,000, which was less than the amount paid for
one passenger death. Today, insurance claims for the value of the
airframe (including loss of use) may be as high as $25 million to
$50 million,' which in many cases will approach or exceed the
amount that will be paid out for an entire planeload of, passenger
claims. Thus there is another party sitting in at the settlement table,
holding a sizeable hand: the attorney for the hull insurer who has
paid out millions of dollars to the airline on the hull insurance
policy, and who now seeks to recover part or all of that payment
through a subrogation suit against the government or a manufac-
turer. With claims increasing in size because of inflation and ex-
panded liability concepts, it is not unusual for airline crash litiga-
tion to result in total payment of more than $100 million.' With
the stakes that high, and with so many parties involved, the stage
is set for compromise through appropriate contributions by various
defendants to the final settlement. The litigation process thus be-
comes the mechanism through which a satisfactory formula can
be worked out to accommodate the interests of all of these parties.
Because of the size and complexity of these claims, it generally
takes a year or more of extensive discovery to bring all the parties
to the point where a satisfactory contribution formula can be
arranged. A trial or threat of trial on the issue of liability may
sometimes be required to bring about such a formula. But the
"Settlement Formula" has become the immediate target of lawyers
who are continuously involved in this type of litigation. Once the
percentages of contribution have been arrived at, the log jam is
usually broken, and the litigation can be terminated by payments
which satisfy all of the interests involved. The combined financial
428 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976). Dickens v. United States, 545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir.
1977); United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964); Union Trust
Co. v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1953), afl'd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), afg'd sub nom. United States
v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
5 For example, in the Tenerife disaster, the hull loss was over $60 million.
Bus. INS., Feb. 20, 1978, at 30.
" For example, in the Turkish Airlines DC-10 accident of 1974, the total pay-
ment was in the neighborhood of $100 million. Bus. INs., Dec. 12, 1977, at 6.
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resources and insurance coverage of airlines, manufacturers, air-
port operators, and other parties are adequate to provide satisfac-
tory settlements in the few hundred cases of passenger injury and
death that occur each year, without costing the airlines and manu-
facturers as much as one per cent of their total operating costs.
Therefore, airline crash litigation is one area in which the po-
tential exists for fair compensation of all claimants and fair
spreading of the risks, with a minimal burden on commerce and
on society as a whole.
These dynamic forces, if harnessed, can be used to bring speedy
justice in airline crash litigation. The question remains, what de-
vices and procedures are most effective in bringing about the
Settlement Formula at the earliest date.
2. The Multidistrict Litigation Procedures
Prior to 1968, the courts were hard pressed to find suitable pro-
cedures for processing airline crash cases, particularly in situations
where suits were filed in several different jurisdictions.! In 1968,
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. section 1407, ' creating the Judicial
7 For example, in the litigation arising out of the collision between two air-
liners which occurred over the Grand Canyon on June 30, 1956, suits were filed
in at least twelve different state and federal courts, and the issues were tried to
conclusion separately in four different state and federal courts.
828 U.S.C. S 1407 (1970), provides as follows:
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions
of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be trans-
ferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial pro-
ceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judical panel on multi-
district litigation authorized by this section upon its determination
that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct
of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by
the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings
to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel
may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party
claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the
action is remanded.
(b) Such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall
be conducted by a judge or judges to whom such actions are as-
signed by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation. For this pur-
pose, upon request of the panel, a circuit judge or a district judge
may be designated and assigned temporarily for service in the trans-
feree district by the Chief Justice of the United States or the chiefjudge of the circuit, as may be required, in accordance with the pro-
visions of chapter 13 of this title. With the consent of the transferee
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Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. The Panel, consisting of seven
federal circuit and district judges appointed by the Chief Justice of
the United States, is authorized to transfer civil actions which are
district court, such actions may be assigned by the panel to a judge
or judges of such district. The judge or judges to whom such ac-
tions are assigned, the members of the judicial panel on multidistrict
litigation, and other circuit and district judges designated when
needed by the panel may exercise the powers of a district judge in
any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in
such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
(c) Proceedings for the transfer of an action under this section
may be initiated by-
(i) the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation upon its own
initiative, or
(ii) motion filed with the panel by a party in any action in
which transfer for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceed-
ings under this section may be appropriate. A copy of such mo-
tion shall be filed in the district court in which the moving party's
action is pending.
The panel shall give notice to the parties in all actions in which
transfers for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings are
contemplated, and such notice shall specify the time and place of
any hearing to determine whether such transfer shall be made. Or-
ders of the panel to set a hearing and other orders of the panel is-
sued prior to the order either directing or denying transfer shall be
filed in the office of the clerk of the district court in which a trans-
fer hearing is to be or has been held. The panel's order of transfer
shall be based upon a record of such hearing at which material evi-
dence may be offered by any party to an action pending in any dis-
trict that would be affected by the proceedings under this section,
and shall be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law
based upon such record. Orders of transfer and such other orders as
the panel may make thereafter shall be filed in the office of the
clerk of the district court of the transferee district and shall be
effective when thus filed. The clerk of the transferee district court
shall forthwith transmit a certified copy of the panel's order to
transfer to the clerk of the district court from which the action is
being transferred. An order denying transfer shall be filed in each
district wherein there is a case pending in which the motion for
transfer has been made.
(d) The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of
seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the
Chief Justice of the United States, no two of whom shall be from
the same circuit. The concurrence of four members shall be neces-
sary to any action by the panel.
(e) No proceedings for review of any order of the panel may
be permitted except by extraordinary writ pursuant to the provisions
of title 28, section 1651, United States Code. Petitions for an extra-
ordinary writ to review an order of the panel to set a transfer hear-
ing and other orders of the panel issued prior to the order either
directing or denying transfer shall be filed only in the court of
appeals having jurisdiction over the district in which a hearing is
to be or has been held. Petitions for an extraordinary writ to review
an order to transfer or orders subsequent to transfer shall be filed
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pending in different federal district courts and which involve com-
mon factual questions to one district for consolidated pre-trial pro-
ceedings. Although the statutory authority for transfer and con-
solidation was limited to pre-trial proceedings, in practice the great
majority of aviation accident cases transferred by the Panel under
section 1407 have been settled or tried by transferee courts, rather
than being remanded to the district courts from which they were
transferred. The general subject of the Panel's functions in aviation
accident cases and in other types of litigation has been well covered
elsewhere.! For purposes of this article it is assumed that practically
all major airline accident cases will be subject to transfer to a
single district judge under section 1407, since there are usually pas-
sengers and claimants from several different federal districts who
will file suit in different federal district courts. The question, there-
fore, is not whether Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) procedures
will be used, but how they can best be used to expedite this litiga-
tion.
Drawing upon nearly ten years of MDL airline accident litiga-
tion experience, it is possible to reach some general conclusions
about the procedures which have achieved the best results. These
conclusions all relate to the methods which should be employed
by the transferee court in dealing with multidistrict litigation. First,
only in the court of appeals having jurisdiction over the transferee
district. There shall be no appeal or review of an order of the panel
denying a motion to transfer for consolidated or coordinated pro-
ceedings.
(f) The panel may prescribe rules for the conduct of its business
not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(g) Nothing in this section shall apply to any action in which
the United States is a complainant arising under the antitrust laws.
"Antitrust laws" as used herein include those acts referred to in the
Act of October 15, 1914, as amended (38 Stat. 730; 15 U.S.C. 12),
and also include the Act of June 19, 1936 (49 Stat. 1526; 15 U.S.C.
13, 13a, and 13b) and the Act of September 26, 1914, as added
March 21, 1938 (52 Stat. 116, 117; 15 U.S.C. 56); but shall not in-
clude section 4A of the Act of October 15, 1914, as added July 7,
1955 (69 Stat. 282; 15 U.S.C. 15a). (Added Pub. L. 90-296, § 1,
Apr. 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 109.)
"See Cahn, A Look at the Judical Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 72 F.R.D.
211 (1976); Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation,
87 HRv. L. REV. 1001 (1974); McDermott, 37 J. Am L. & COM. 159 (1971);
and articles by McDermott, Farrell, Beatty, von Kalinowsky, and Atkins in 38
J. Am L. & COM. (1972).
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the transferee court should assume firm control of discovery and
pre-trial activities, setting firm deadlines for completion of all pre-
trial proceedings, including motions, discovery, and pre-trial con-
ferences. Secondly, the transferee court should set an early date
for consolidated trial on the issue of liability. Thirdly, section
1404(a)"° or similar procedures should be used to transfer all cases
to the transferee court for purposes of trial, at least on questions
of liability. Fourthly, the transferee court should avoid the use of
class action procedures under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the trans-
feree court should make suitable provisions for the representation
of all plaintiffs by a Plaintiffs' Committee, which is given the sole
responsibility and power to conduct discovery and pre-trial pro-
ceedings on behalf of all plaintiffs. In four cases since 1971, appli-
cation of these methods has resulted in efficient and expeditious
handling of multidistrict litigation.
3. Examples of Major MDL Successes
As federal district judges gained experience with MDL proce-
dures, the results improved dramatically. Senior District Judge
Peirson M. Hall of the Central District of California must be con-
sidered the pioneer in breathing life into the MDL procedures." In
10 28 U.S.C. 5 1404(a) (1970), provides that: "For the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil ac-
tion to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
11 Judge Hall is the undisputed champion American judge in terms of number
of aviation accident cases. His first airline crash assignment was the 1958 mid-
air collision which occurred above Las Vegas. Judge Hall wrote thirty separate
opinions during that litigation, which took more than eight years to conclude.
See United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964). This experience led
Judge Hall to search for better ways to handle such cases. He was also the trial
judge in cases arising out of the United Air Lines Salt Lake City crash of No-
vember 1, 1965, and the Bonanza Air Lines crash of November 15, 1964. After
the MDL procedures came into effect in 1968, Judge Hall was assigned as trans-
feree judge in cases arising out of the Thai Airways crash which occurred at
Hong Kong on June 30, 1967 (MDL No. 15), In re Air Crash Disaster at
Hong Kong, 298 F. Supp. 390 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969); the Air Canada crash which
occurred at Toronto on July 15, 1970 (MDL No. 103), In re Air Crash Disaster
at Toronto International Airport, 345 F. Supp. 533 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972); the mid-
air collision between a Hughes Air West DC-9 and a military aircraft which
occurred at Duarte, California on June 6, 1961 (MDL No. 106), In re Air Crash
Disaster at Duarte, California, 346 F. Supp. 529 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972); the Alaska
Airlines crash at Juneau, Alaska which occurred on September 4, 1971 (MDL
No. 107), In re Air Juneau, Alaska, Air Disaster Litigation, 350 F. Supp. 1163
(J.P.M.D.L. 1972); the Turkish Airlines DC-10 crash which occurred near Paris
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the litigation arising out of the crash of a Boeing 727 operated by
Alaska Airlines at Juneau, Alaska, on September 4, 1971, involv-
ing 111 deaths, the cases were transferred to Judge Hall under 28
U.S.C. section 1407 (MDL Docket No. 107). Although Judge Hall
was confronted by about sixty different plaintiffs' attorneys at his
first pre-trial conference in San Francisco, he appointed a Plaintiffs'
Committee to conduct all pre-trial proceedings on behalf of all the
plaintiffs. He then proceeded to expedite the litigation by hold-
ing numerous pre-trial conferences, keeping a tight rein on dis-
covery, and setting an early trial date. His efforts brought about
settlement of most of the cases by January 1974, less than thirty
months after the crash. This was considered a speedy performance
by 1971 standards, especially in a case involving complicated issues
of liability of the airline and the United States Government. Writ-
ing in the Autumn 1971 edition of the Journal of Air Law &
Commerce, Professor John T. McDermott (who formerly served
as Executive Attorney to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion) made a detailed study of airline crash litigation commenced
prior to 1971, which showed that the average time from crash to
termination was 42.8 months for cases transferred under MDL,
and 44 months for non-transferred cases."2
Judge Hall's success in the Alaska Airlines crash, however, came
at the time when the jumbo jets (with passenger capacity over 300)
were being phased into airline operation. Alaska Airlines involved
111 deaths. The question still remained, what would happen when
the first jumbo jet case hit the already overburdened courts.
On December 29, 1972, the first jumbo jet accident occurred
when an Eastern Airlines Lockheed 1011 Tri-Star crashed in the
Everglades west of Miami International Airport, resulting in 101
deaths and 75 injuries. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion transferred all the pending federal cases under 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1407 to the Southern District of Florida, where they were as-
signed to U. S. District Judge Peter T. Fay for consolidated dis-
on March 3, 1974 (MDL No. 172), In re Air Crash Disaster at Paris, France,
376 F. Supp. 887 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974); and the Pan American crash which occurred
at Pago Pago, American Samoa on January 30, 1974 (MDL No. 176), In re
Air Crash Disaster at Pago Pago, American Samoa, 383 F. Supp. 501 (J.P.M.D.L.
1974).
" McDermott, A Plea for the Preservation of the Public's Interest in Multi-
district Litigation, 37 J. Am L. & COM. 423, at 454-455 (1971).
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covery on the issue of liability. The MDL order of transfer was
dated June 28, 1973."3
Judge Fay assumed firm control of discovery, and was able to
set a date of November 26, 1973, for consolidated trial on the
issue of liability. As far as available records indicate, this was the
first time that the trial of a major airline accident case was sched-
uled to take place less than one year from the date of the crash.
Discovery was actually completed and the parties ready for trial on
October 31, 1973. On November 16, 1973, ten days before the
scheduled opening of trial, a Settlement Formula was reached by
the three defendants (Eastern Airlines, Lockheed Aircraft Cor-
poration, and the United States Government). On that date, Judge
Fay approved a stipulation under which the three defendants agreed
to pay compensatory damages to all claimants, based upon settle-
ments or, if necessary, upon trial of the issue of damages alone.
By early 1974, most of the cases had been settled, and it was
necessary to try only two cases on the issue of damages. Thus, the
first jumbo jet crash resulted in an amazing performance by the
judicial system, with the cases being disposed of in considerably
less time than was generally taken for the much less complicated
airline crash cases of the 1960s.
The Everglades case was followed by an even more compli-
cated jumbo jet disaster: the crash of a Turkish Airlines DC-10
outside of Paris on March 3, 1974, which caused the deaths of
346 occupants, of whom 23 were Americans (from 12 different
states) and the remainder were citizens of 24 foreign countries.
Named as defendants were Turkish Airlines, McDonnell Douglas
Corporation (manufacturer of the airplane), General Dynamics
Corporation (manufacturer of certain sub-assemblies involved in
the failure of a cargo door), and the United States. The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the cases to the Cen-
tral District of California and assigned them to Judge Peirson M.
Hall." Despite knotty problems relating to forum non conveniens
and choice of law, Judge Hall was able to maintain steady momen-
tum, and on July 8, 1975, barely sixteen months after the accident,
13 in re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, 360 F. Supp. 1394
(J.P.M.D.L. 1973).
14 In re Air Crash Disaster at Paris, France, 367 F. Supp. 87 (J.P.M.D.L.
1974).
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Judge Hall was able to announce that the defendants had agreed
on a Settlement Formula and were willing to negotiate settlements
or conduct trials limited to the issue of compensatory damages.'
Settlement negotiations in the Turkish Airlines DC-10 cases were
complicated by the large number of claims and by the fact that the
great majority of the decedents lived in foreign countries, requiring
a great deal of difficult, international discovery activity on damages.
In spite of these difficulties, most of the cases were settled during
1976. Judge Hall supplied a new twist to break deadlocked settle-
ment negotiations by appointing a panel of nine retired California
Superior Court judges. These judges agreed to sit in groups of
three as special masters to receive informal presentations of dam-
age data and to estimate the damages that would be awarded by
a Los Angeles jury in each case. This special masters plan worked
beautifully, supplying all parties with a "dry run" trial result in
each case. In many of the cases the masters actually assisted in final
settlement negotiations. Only two cases had to be tried to verdict
on damages, and at this writing only a handful of cases remain
unsettled.
On December 1, 1974, TWA flight 514, a Boeing 727, crashed
into a mountain while on instrument approach near Upperville,
Virginia, approximately twenty miles from Dulles International
Airport, killing all of the ninety-two people aboard. This accident
gave rise to the most prolonged and hotly contested public hearing
and accident investigation procedure ever conducted by the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB hearing
lasted four weeks and was extensively covered by television and
other media. The airlines, the pilots' unions, and FAA officials used
these NTSB hearings as a sounding board to air their sharply con-
fficting views on the meaning of phraseology used in granting clear-
ances during instrument approaches. This bitter controversy spilled
over into the ensuing litigation, in which the passengers' families
sued TWA, the United States, and Boeing.
Suits were filed in several jurisdictions, and eventually they were
all transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to
the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, where
13 In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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they were assigned to U. S. District Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr."8
Judge Bryan took firm control of the litigation, appointing a
Plaintiffs' Committee on June 24, 1975, and setting a cut-off for
discovery of October 31, 1975, with a final pre-trial conference
set for November 14, 1975, and a trial on all liability issues set for
December 8, 1975. This tight schedule required double teaming
on discovery, with various members of the Plaintiffs' Committee
taking depositions of different witnesses at the same time.
The results were again highly successful. Although Judge Bryan
had set the liability trial for one week following the first anniversary
of the crash, the Settlement Formula was reached on November 21,
1975, less than one year from the date of the accident. Judge
Bryan subsequently set down a schedule of more than forty cases
for damage trials to be held during a period of six weeks. Only
seven cases actually went to trial on damages, all of the others
pending before Judge Bryan being settled without trial.
These performances by three United States District Judges illus-
trate how the MDL procedures can be used to expedite airline
crash litigation. Obviously, the mere assignment of cases to one
judge for pre-trial proceedings under section 1407 does not auto-
matically speed things up or bring about disposition of cases, as
shown by Professor McDermott's studies.17 It is only in those cases
where the transferee judges used the MDL tools aggressively that
salutary results were reached. In all of the examples studied above
(Alaska Airlines, Everglades, Turkish Airlines, and Upperville),
the transferee judges utilized strict control over discovery pro-
cedures, strict deadlines for discovery and trial dates, the pressure
of a liability trial date, and the transfer of all cases for purposes of
trial under section 1404(a) or other procedures.18 Each of these
"' In re Air Crash Disaster near Upperville, Virginia, 373 F. Supp. 1098
(J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
17 See note 12 supra.
"While Judge Fay transferred all the cases to his court for trial on liability
under 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) (1976) in the Everglades litigation, Judge Bryan
found this unnecessary in the Upperville litigation. He had set a date for con-
solidated trial of all the cases on liability, and when a settlement formula was
reached on the eve of that trial, he simply set all of the cases down for damage
trial in his court, putting the burden on each plaintiff to move to remand each
case to the transferor court if this was desired. While the transfer under section
1407 is for pre-trial purposes, transferee judges have transferred cases to them-
selves for all purposes under section 1404(a) on the ground that it is a motion
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transferee judges also paid special attention to what is probably the
most important variable that can be controlled by the court: the
character and makeup of the Plaintiffs' Committee. The work of
experienced professionals can obviously expedite airline crash liti-
gation and can help the parties to reach a Settlement Formula at
the earliest date. Since the defendants customarily select specialists
to represent them, the court has no discretion on that side of the
case. The one option open to the court, therefore, is on the plain-
tiffs' side of the case. The issue now arises as to how the selection of
the Plaintiffs' Committee can assist the court and the parties to
obtain speedy justice.
4. The Plaintiffs' Committee
One of the most frightening aspects of jumbo jet litigation is
the number of different attorneys who represent various plaintiffs
and how their interests can be combined without doing violence
to the principle that each plaintiff is entitled to be represented by
an attorney of his own choice. The courts have long held, however,
that the trial judge has inherent power to select one or more attor-
neys to supervise and coordinate the claims of the plaintiffs in pro-
ceedings involving numerous claimants."9 The old concept that
each plaintiff should be allowed to litigate the case to conclusion
through his own attorney, said the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently, is
a nostalgic luxury no longer available in the hard-pressed federal
courts. It overlooks the much larger interests which arise in litiga-
tion such as this. Each case in the consolidated case was private in
its inception. But the number and cumulative size of the massed
cases created a penumbra of class-type interest on the part of all
the litigants and of public interest on the part of the court and the
world at large. The power of the court must be assayed in this semi-
public context.'
for a change of venue, which is part of the pre-trial procedure. This position
was upheld in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1974).
' MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958).
SIn re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1977). While the Fifth Circuit spoke of a "class-type interest," note that
this is not the same as a class action. Class actions were designed to afford
claimants with relatively insignificant financial interests the opportunity to com-
bine their claims in litigation which would otherwise be prohibitively expensive
for each individual plaintiff to pursue. Usually this element is not present in air-
line crash litigation, since each individual case usually represents a six or seven
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Since the primary goal of the courts and the parties in airline
crash litigation is to reach the Settlement Formula at the earliest
date, it is essential that experienced professionals be engaged on
both sides to work toward that end. The defendants take care of
this problem themselves by retaining experienced professional spec-
ialists in the great majority of cases. This narrows the problem
down to the plaintiffs. There are usually aviation specialists avail-
able who have already been retained by some plaintiffs and who
have prior experience in the work of MDL Plaintiffs' Committees.
The problem, therefore, narrows itself down to the best method for
selection and compensation of such counsel.
Various methods have been tried by various courts. Some courts
have tried to follow the suggestions in the Manual for Complex
Litigation," which contains suggested pre-trial and trial procedures
for complex cases, whether or not multidistrict litigation is involved.
The suggestions in the Manual relating to appointment of rep-
resentative counsel for plaintiff, however, are based upon peculiar
needs of class action and antitrust litigation, in which there are
often hundreds and sometimes thousands of plaintiffs. The pro-
visions of the Manual relating to control of attorneys' fees and ex-
penses in class actions," liaison counsel," and lead counsel and
steering committee" have not been found particularly useful in
meeting the special problems of airline crash litigation, which
represents less than twenty per cent of multidistrict litigation, and
an even smaller percentage of the complex litigation addressed by
the Manual. Class action and antitrust cases demand a large
volume of detailed administrative work, requiring the services of
steering committees to coordinate the actions of groups of parties
having common interests and liaison counsel to assure proper
figure financial loss. The advantages which individual plaintiffs could gain from
class actions in airline crash litigation are available to them through the MDL
procedures. Therefore, in the absence of special circumstances, the courts have
not granted class action status to airline crash litigation or to other forms of
tort litigation. Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977);
McDonnell Douglas v. United States District Court, 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.
1975).
1 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE, Manual for Complex Litigation (2d ed.
1977).
Id. 5 1.47, at 267.
"Id. 5 1.90, at 276.
',Id. 5 1.92, at 278.
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communications between the court and all counsel. These prob-
lems, however, do not usually arise in airline crash litigation,
even in the jumbo jet variety such as the Turkish Airlines DC-10
case which involved more than 300 lawsuits. Normally there is
a fairly small group of attorneys representing plaintiffs who are
in a position professionally and financially to undertake the rigors
of pre-trial preparation and trial of the liability phase of these
cases. It is to these counsel that the courts have turned in the most
successful instances of MDL airlines litigation.
From the successful experience of Judges Hall, Fay, and Bryan
in the MDL litigation referred to above, it is possible to draw a
composite picture of the most effective means of selection of coun-
sel to represent plaintiffs. Various titles have been used, such as
"Plaintiffs' Committee," "Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel," or "Plaintiffs'
Discovery Committee." "Plaintiffs' Committee" is the most flexible
and therefore the most desirable title, especially since the title
"Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel" gives the impression that these attor-
neys have been selected to try the case for the plaintiffs. It is
not necessary for the court to designate trial counsel. The primary
target of the litigation is the Settlement Formula, which often can
be reached without a trial of liability. This phase is likely to oc-
cupy the court for at least the first year of litigation. Accordingly,
the first order designating counsel for the plaintiffs can be limited
to the appointment of a Plaintiffs' Committee which is given the
responsibility and duty of conducting pre-trial discovery on behalf
of all the plaintiffs. This includes making all necessary motions on
matters such as choice of law, and all other phases of the case
which are common to all of the plaintiffs, up to the time of trial.
Normally this appointment is made in a "practice and procedure
order" which should make it clear that the Plaintiffs' Committee
serves in a fiduciary capacity for all of the plaintiffs. Thus, even
though the members of the Plaintiffs' Committee normally repre-
sent their own clients as well as the clients of other lawyers, if their
own clients should settle their cases before the work of the com-
mittee is completed, the members of the Plaintiffs' Committee are
obligated to carry on their duties for the benefit of those non-clients
whom they have come to represent through their duties on the
Plaintiffs' Committee.
The practice and procedure order appointing the Plaintiffs' Coin-
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mittee should give notice to all counsel that the fees for the serv-
ices of the Plaintiffs' Committee will be fixed by the court and that
no further cases will be settled or dismissed by the court without
proper provision being made for payment of such fees. The right
of the Plaintiffs' Committee to be compensated for services is well
established in aviation cases, as in other types of mass disaster and
common interest litigation." It is also appropriate for the order to
provide that the fees of the Plaintiffs' Committee will be payable
out of the fees of the personal attorneys rather than by the claim-
ants. The claimants have already contracted to pay their personal
attorneys an overall fee which presumably includes the burden of
preparing and trying the liability phase of the case. Since the per-
sonal attorneys are being relieved of the burden of handling the
liability phase of the case and are having the work done for them
by the Plaintiffs' Committee, the courts deem it fair and equitable
to charge the fees of the Plaintiffs' Committee against fees of the
personal attorneys rather than the claimants involved. -"
25 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Vincent v. Hughes
Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida
Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977). 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES ch.
7 (1973). The Everglades decision upheld the award by Judge Fay of a fee of
8% to the Plaintiffs' Committee, for the work that they did in pre-trial discovery
which led to the establishment of the settlement formula on the eve of trial. (In
otherwise approving the handling of the fee question by Judge Fay, the Fifth
Circuit directed him to hold a full evidentiary hearing and to enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the award of attorney's fees to the Plaintiffs' Com-
mittee.) In cases where the Plaintiffs' Committee or Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel ac-
tually takes the case to trial on liability, presumably higher fees might be awarded,
depending upon the amount and complexity of the work involved.
20In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1019-1020
(5th Cir. 1977). In that decision, the Fifth Circuit adopted the views of Judge
Peirson M. Hall that in airline crash cases, "the costs of this type of litigation are
inordinately and unpredictably great, and the legal skills required of plaintiffs'
counsel in such cases are prodigiously exacting for preparation and for trial on
the question of liability," and that "it is fair and just that those who are deriving
benefits from efforts of counsel inuring to the benefit of all claimants resulting
from the death of passengers should bear their fair share of repayment of the
costs and payment for counsel's skill and time and effort which have been de-
voted to the common question of establishing liability." 549 F.2d at 1020. The
personal attorneys are relieved of the burden of taking a year or more out of
their practices to work on a single case, and are thus able to devote most of their
time to the affairs of other clients while the Plaintiffs' Committee is making it
possible for them to obtan a maximum recovery and a higher overall fee by dis-
posing of the liability issue. If aviation specialists were not available to staff
Plantiffs' Committees, the airlines and other defendants would soon gain the
upper hand in this litigation, due to their superior financial leverage and central-
ization of effort. This was the pattern before World War II and in the early post-
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As to selection of the members of the Plaintiffs' Committee,
various methods have been tried, ranging from the "town meeting"
type of election to selection by the court itself. The most effective
method that has emerged from experience occurs when the court
directs each plaintiff's attorney to submit to the court a suggested
program for handling the liability phase of the case, together with
a statement of the experience and qualifications of counsel sug-
gested as members of the Plaintiffs' Committee. The most effective
Plaintiffs' Committees have been composed of two, three, or at most
four attorneys, since any groups larger than this tend to become
less efficient."
If and when a trial on liability becomes necessary, the court can
deal with the selection of lead trial counsel. Normally lead trial
counsel will be one or two attorneys, a smaller number than serve
on the Plaintiffs' Committee. The court should certainly take into
consideration the recommendations of the majority of the Plaintiffs'
Committee as to who should be lead trial counsel. This determina-
tion can best be made by the trial judge around the time of final
pre-trial hearing, assuming that a Settlement Formula has not been
reached by that time. As previously pointed out, where there is an
effective Plaintiffs' Committee, and where the transferee judge ag-
gressively uses the other tools available under MDL procedures, the
dynamic forces at work in this litigation will usually bring the
parties to a satisfactory Settlement Formula, and trial of liability
will not be necessary.
5. State Court Cases in MDL Situations
It has been suggested that one of the weaknesses of the MDL
war days, when many airline crash cases were settled for relatively low amounts
because the plaintiffs' attorneys did not have the resources to bring such cases to
trial under favorable circumstances. Judges Hall and Fay also took into considera-
tion the fact that the Plaintiffs' Committee is called upon to advance large sums
for costs of depositions and other pre-trial preparation.
27 In the Everglades litigation, Judge Fay appointed a committee of two local
(Miami) attorneys, and authorized the use of two aviation law specialists as
counsel to the committee. In the Upperville litigation, Judge Bryan appointed
a committee of three attorneys. In the Turkish Airlines DC-JO litigation, there
were three large groups of claimants, each of which was represented by special-
ist firms. These specialist firms got together and worked out the coordination of
discovery and other pre-trial preparation among themselves, and therefore it was
not necessary to make any provision for attorneys' fees for a Plaintiffs' Com-
mittee.
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procedure is that it cannot work when some cases are pending in
the state courts, since the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
can order transfers only of cases pending in the federal district
courts. 8 Sophisticated techniques have been developed, however,
which make it possible to coordinate all the litigation even though
part of it is pending in state courts. For example, in one of the
earliest MDL cases (MDL No. 13), involving the death cases
arising out of the crash of a Piedmont Airlines Boeing 727 which
collided with a Cessna 310 near Hendersonville, North Carolina,
on July 9, 1967, many of the suits were filed in North Carolina
state courts because of lack of diversity of citizenship. In that case,
the airline was domiciled in North Carolina, as were a number of
the plaintiffs. An effective Plaintiffs' Committee was appointed,
however, and excellent coordination was established between Judge
Woodrow W. Jones of the U. S. District Court for Western Dis-
trict of North Carolina, and Judge Harry C. Martin of the Superior
Court for Henderson County, North Carolina. A number of joint
hearings were held by these two judges, and discovery was effec-
tively coordinated between the state and federal courts."
In addition, some state courts have established procedures similar
to those used by federal courts in MDL cases. In litigation arising
out of the Boeing 707 Varig Airlines crash which occurred near
Paris on July 11, 1973, sixty-one cases were filed in the Supreme
Court of the State of New York for the County of New York.
Supreme Court Justice Edward R. Dudley, Administrative Judge
for the Civil Branch of the First Judicial District (covering the area
of New York City in which most of the world's airlines have
offices), recognized this litigation as a "complex case" and arranged
to give it special treatment similar to the MDL procedures. He
assigned the entire litigation to Justice Arnold Fraiman, and from
28 Martin, Multidistrict Litigation-A Panacea or a Blight?, 10 FORUM 853,
864 (1975).
29 One of the orders entered by Judge Martin relating to joint discovery and
the functions of the Plaintiffs' Committee is reproduced in S. SPEISER & P. RHnIN-
GOLD, NEGLIGENCE CASE TECHNIQUES-HANDLING THE BIG NEGLIGENCE CASE
356-58 (Practising Law Institute 1969). In the Florida Everglades litigation,
Judge Fay used similar techniques to coordinate with the state court judge who
had about 25 related cases assigned to him. Had a trial on liability become
necessary, Judge Fay planned to conduct a joint trial of the federal and state
cases, using two separate juries, with the federal and state judges presiding
jointly. However, this became unnecessary when all of the parties in the state
court actions agreed to be bound by the results of the federal liability trial.
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that point on it was processed in a manner very similar to an MDL
case. The result was that in less than two years from the date when
the first suit was filed, most of the cases were settled or were in the
process of settlement, with payments being shared by various de-
fendants.
The existence of this state court "complex case" procedure should
prove useful in the litigation arising out of the collision between
two Boeing 747 jumbo jets (one operated by Pan American Air-
ways and the other by KLM Royal Dutch Airlines), which oc-
curred at Tenerife in the Canary Islands on March 27, 1977. The
Tenerife accident was the worst air disaster of all time up to that
point, involving 580 deaths and dozens of serious injuries. The
Tenerife litigation was brought to the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation, which transferred all the pending cases to the
Southern District of New York and assigned them to U. S. District
Judge Robert J. Ward." While most of the claims made on behalf
of decedents or passengers who were aboard the Pan American
plane were filed in federal courts, most of the claims made on be-
half of Dutch families were filed in the New York state courts, be-
cause of lack of diversity of citizenship between Dutch claimants
and the Dutch airline. Justice Dudley again decided that complex
case treatment was appropriate, and he assigned all of the Tenerife
cases pending in the New York Supreme Court to Justice Martin
B. Stecher. Accordingly, the Tenerife litigation will provide another
test of the flexibility of the MDL procedures working in conjunc-
tion with state court procedures. The existence of the New York
State Complex Case procedure should greatly expedite the use of
MDL procedures in the Tenerife litigation.
o In re Air Crash Disaster at Tenerife, Canary Islands, No. 306 (J.P.M.D.L.,
opinion and order dated August 16, 1977).
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